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The rise of “behavioral man”: Randomized 
controlled trials and the “new” 
development agenda
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Abstract
Despite their ostensible differences, both randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and neoclassical economics, which undergirds 
neoliberalism, are characterized by unrealistic assumptions. This is not accidental but stems from a common desire for sci-
entism, despite a substitution of “economic man” by what we call “behavioral man” in the former. However, the interactions 
between human behavior and context produce much greater diversity than allowed for in such approaches. As a result of 
these failings, RCTs do not challenge neoliberalism, but rather can be inserted into and help legitimize it. Consequently they 
do not alter the structural conditions producing poverty, but represent a form of “virtualism” that attempts to make the real 
conform to the ideal of neoclassical economics through “nudging.” This is often associated with conditionality, representing 
a continuation of the historically Northern- centered coloniality of power, which sometimes leads to ethical breaches and 
perverse development outcomes. Some examples from RCTs conducted or published by the World Bank—which has be-
come a lead agency in promoting RCTs to assess the effectiveness of aid—in Africa are presented to illustrate our 
argument.
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El surgimiento del "hombre de comportamiento": ensayos controlados aleatorios y la 
"nueva" agenda de desarrollo
Resumen
A pesar de sus diferencias ostensibles, tanto los ensayos controlados aleatorios (ECA) como la economía neoclásica, que 
sustenta el neoliberalismo, se caracterizan por suposiciones poco realistas. Esto no es accidental, sino que surge de un deseo 
común de cientificismo, a pesar de una sustitución de "hombre económico" por lo que llamamos "hombre de comportamien-
to" en el primero. Sin embargo, las interacciones entre el comportamiento humano y el contexto producen una diversidad 
mucho mayor que la permitida en tales enfoques. Como resultado de estas fallas, los ECA no cuestionan el neoliberalismo, 
sino que pueden insertarse y ayudar a legitimarlo. En consecuencia, no alteran las condiciones estructurales que producen 
pobreza, sino que representan una forma de "virtualismo" 
que intenta hacer que lo real se ajuste al ideal de la economía 
neoclásica a través del "empujón". Esto a menudo se asocia 
con la condicionalidad, lo que representa una continuación 
de la colonialidad del poder históricamente centrada en el 
norte, que a veces conduce a violaciones éticas y resultados 
de desarrollo perversos. Se presentan algunos ejemplos de 
ECA en África para ilustrar nuestro argumento, los cuales 
han sido realizados o publicados por el Banco Mundial, que 
se ha convertido en una agencia líder en la promoción de 
ECA para evaluar la eficacia de la ayuda.
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Esther Duflo won a Noble Prize this year for her work in 
poor countries. Now the French- American economist wants 
to use the limelight to rescue the battered reputation of her 
profession and restore its role in tackling the problems that 
are plaguing the rich world (Strauss, 2019).
The rise of the random in development
Perhaps one of the biggest and most controversial debates in 
international development has been around the nature, 
impacts, and consequently desirability of overseas develop-
ment assistance (ODA). Some aid sceptics, from different 
ideological positions and perspectives, have called for it to 
be eliminated or reduced (Easterly, 2007, 2015; Glennie, 
2008; Moyo, 2009; Tandon, 2008). In contrast, perhaps 
ODA’s most vocal and visible proponent, Sachs (2005), has 
called for a “big push” to increase it and make it more effec-
tive. However, in recent decades other positions have also 
emerged.
Some argue that given the massive diversity and com-
plexity of different contexts, aid needs to be tailored effec-
tively by those who understand, and are embedded in, these 
places (Ramalingam, 2015). Others in the “doing develop-
ment differently” school argue that aid donors should be 
more proactive in politically supporting domestic “reform-
ers”1 to achieve their policy programs (Yanguas, 2018). 
However, neither of these more recent approaches has been 
as successful in propagating its precepts and advice as that of 
the proponents of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
largely based on, and perhaps best summarized in, the work 
of Banerjee and Duflo (2012). In the past two decades, many 
economists and political scientists engaged in development 
studies have adopted RCTs in their research. Does this signal 
a turn toward “post- political” methodologies or do RCTs 
align with the precepts of neoliberalism and therefore not 
only not challenge it but also enable its perpetuation in the 
Global South?
Banerjee and Duflo argue that aid is neither inherently good 
nor bad, but that it needs to be targeted and delivered appropri-
ately based on the experience of what is already working, or 
might work, to achieve its desired outcomes. They contend that 
whether an aid intervention will work can be tested in advance on 
the basis of RCTs, which enable researchers to determine “what 
really works” in development.
RCTs have, in recent years, been widely adopted in devel-
opment programs and practice around the world and, accord-
ing to some of the world’s most prominent development 
economists, are now the “gold standard” in impact evalua-
tion (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2015). As perhaps the world’s 
most influential development institution, the World Bank has 
heavily promoted RCTs to “improve” their development pol-
icy efforts particularly after heavy criticism by the Banerjee 
et al. (2006) review of its research.2 This has particularly 
been the case in Africa where the cost of experimentation is 
low and resistance is weak and justified by the continued 
widespread presence of poverty, and policy failures of the 
past.
The RCT technique was initially developed in medicine 
in order to determine the effectiveness of drug treatments, 
although it has also been used in economics since the 1960s 
(Webber and Prouse, 2018). RCTs work by identifying a tar-
get group or population that is to receive an intervention, 
such as a vaccination, training, or mobile phone application, 
and then a control group that will not.3 After the target group 
has received the intervention, its impact is measured relative 
to the control group. In order to ensure the “scientific valid-
ity” of the RCT, it is important to ensure that the control 
group, against which the effects of the intervention can be 
measured, is a suitable comparator for the treatment group. 
This means that the characteristics of the control group 
should be as similar as possible to those of the treatment 
group, before the intervention. This is meant to be achieved 
through random selection of participants from the same pop-
ulation (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2015).
Randomization of people, groups, or firms into the control 
and treatment groups is meant to solve the problem of confound-
ing variables, selection bias, and endogeneity, which can occur in 
other forms of testing. When this method is deployed, it is argued 
that it is possible to attribute or attach measured differences 
between the treatment and control groups to the intervention’s 
impact. Whereas conventional macroeconomics has been exten-
sively criticized for making unrealistic assumptions, such as the 
absence of unemployment (cf. Sheppard, 2016), RCTs are a 
branch of empirical, ostensibly “theory free” (Deaton and 
Cartwright, 2018) economics that are thought to be insulated 
from this criticism. However, as we will show, RCTs are based 
on assumptions about the nature of human behavior—what we 
call here “behavioral man,” described in more detail later—and, 
as a result, share epistemological similarities with neoclassical 
economics. This may frustrate the achievement of their declared 
objectives and allow for alignment in practice with neoliberal 
policy approaches, which often place responsibility on those liv-
ing in poverty.4
RCTs and behavioral economics: the rise of 
behavioral man
The history of mainstream economists’ science envy or 
respect for scientism has been well- documented. Beginning 
in the mid- 19th century when the founding fathers of the 
neoclassical school appropriated the mathematical 
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formalism of energy physics (Mirowski, 1991), generations 
of economists have drawn on paradigms and methods from 
natural sciences, from information science to biology. Today, 
the mutual imbrication of certain forms of psychology and 
economics, in the form of behavioral economics, is particu-
larly popular (Davis, 2013: World Bank, 2015). In the case of 
RCTs, as discussed above, the World Bank—a leading pro-
moter of these—and others have looked to medical, particu-
larly pharmaceutical, research as a model to emulate.
Like all metaphors, the mimicry of medicine by experi-
menting economists biases knowledge and practice in subtle, 
often overlooked, ways. The use of RCTs in development 
has further entrenched a thin vision of economy, which 
explicitly seeks to remove or downplay the importance of 
social, political, economic, and cultural contexts—that is, 
geography. Rather both RCTs and neoclassical economics 
are characterized by methodological individualism—that is, 
the idea that social outcomes arise from the decisions of 
individuals.
The microfoundations of neoclassical economics are 
defined by a commitment not only to methodological indi-
vidualism but also to homo economicus or self- interested 
economic man, and the acceptance of equilibrium as a natu-
ral state. Assumptions about human behavior are a product 
of both rational deduction and axiomatic reasoning (posited 
set of rules where rational predictable behavior is assumed 
without explanation or proof). A number of general proposi-
tions arise from these microfoundations that are at the heart 
of the theories underlying neoliberalism. These include the 
commitment to state minimalism, a preoccupation with static 
efficiency, a focus on distortions and marginality, changes in 
relative prices leading to predictable outcomes, and finally 
development is seen as a static equilibrium state. Closely 
aligned with neoclassical theory is the presumed static effi-
ciency gains that purportedly arise for countries through free 
trade that nudge countries to follow their comparative advan-
tage (Stein, 2008: 60–65). While “randomistas problema-
tized settled practices and knowledge, turning ‘matter of 
fact’ into ‘matters of concern’” (Donovan, 2018: 2), their 
epistemology, and hence methods, share close affinity with 
those of neoclassical economics. For example, Banerjee and 
Duflo (2019) see free trade as optimal. Furthermore, while 
they say that conventional growth theory “fails radically,” 
they argue there is no need to throw the “baby out with the 
bath water” as this can be corrected through the use of a 
“simple model which explicitly introduces the possibility of 
misallocation into an otherwise standard growth model” 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2004: 1). The source of such “misallo-
cation” is, of course, poor human decisions, which can be 
corrected. Such statements put Duflo and Banerjee firmly 
within the mainstream of orthodox, equilibrium economics, 
even if they have a reformist approach to it.5
RCTs and the work of Duflo, Banerjee, Kremer,6 and 
many others have brought behavioral economics to the field 
of mainstream development economics, which has 
increasingly focused on development as a product of individ-
ual behavior at the microeconomic level.7 Behavioral eco-
nomics deviates from neoclassical economics in its 
assumptions by modifying the idea of all- seeing, “fully ratio-
nal,” “economic man” by including insights from psychol-
ogy around people’s time horizons in economic discounting 
and loss aversion, for example (for more details, see Berndt, 
2015).
Behavioral economics often gathers evidence that can be 
in conflict with the core propositions of neoclassical eco-
nomics outlined above. This can lead to different reactions. 
Some become “flaw finders,” which point to problems but do 
not come up with an alternative.8 Others believe in altering 
the theory through incremental modification or extension, or 
the replacement of some aspect of it. Most behavioral eco-
nomics focuses on the last two, building on mainstream the-
ory but not rejecting it (Joffe, 2019). As Thaler (2015) 
(winner of the 2017 Nobel Prize for his work in behavioral 
economics) put it:
We need an enriched approach to doing economic research…
The good news is that we do not need to throw away every-
thing that we know about how economies and markets work. 
Theories based on the assumption that everyone is an Econ 
[homo economicus] should not be discarded. They remain 
useful as starting points for more realistic models. (quoted 
in Joffe, 2019: 231)
Joffe (2019) documents in more detail the way behavioral 
economics deals with evidence inconsistent with neoclassical 
economic propositions. The first approach (found in the work of 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) is to rely on “a priori” principle 
that sees the rational behavior of homo economicus as basically 
correct and the empirical observations as heuristic principles that 
represent approximations and judgment calls in the real world. A 
second (as documented by Angner and Loewenstein, 2012) is to 
see rational behavior as normatively superior and actual observa-
tions to be mistakes. Behavioral economics is aimed at under-
standing the psychology of error that is inferior to fully rational 
behavior and setting up interventions to correct it. The third, as 
illustrated in the work of Smith (1989), is to see “less than ideal 
behavior” as short- term blips in the movement toward a long- 
term equilibrium as the pressures of the market push people into 
fully rational behavior. Hence, ex ante behavior might fall short, 
but ex post it will be brought back into equilibrium with the 
assumed behavior of neoclassical economic man. A fourth 
approach of behavioral economics is to develop a theory that 
explains both rational behavior and deviations from it. This is 
sometimes known as the “benchmark and biases” approach to 
behavioral economics (cf. Thaler, 2015). Behavioral economics 
seeks to “correct” these “distortions” or “biases” of the human 
psyche through targeted policy interventions and nudges—to 
turn “behavioral man” into an approximation of “economic 
man,” while still allowing the “freedom to choose” (Friedman 
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and Friedman, 1980), under the auspices of “libertarian paternal-
ism” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009).9
Behavioral man, which is implicitly at the core of behav-
ioral economics, is a modification of the theory of “economic 
man,” which informed much of prior economic theory. In 
conventional economic theory, people are assumed to be 
utility maximisers, which translates as them being selfish, 
greedy, and lazy (Collier, 2020). However, people are much 
more complex and have a wider set of motivations and emo-
tions. The implicit theory of behavioral man seeks a better, 
though still abstracted, model of human psychology and 
behavior and then beyond that, through policy intervention, 
to approximate or bring “economic man” into being.
Neoliberal “virtualism” (Carrier and Miller, 1998) seeks 
to make the real world of existing social relations conform to 
the ideals of market “society.” As McMahon (2015) has bril-
liantly demonstrated, behavioral economics seeks to create 
homo economicus out of “imperfect people” through the 
construction of choice architectures. In a sense, RCTs can be 
seen to fit neatly into this mold, as they attempt to correct 
aggregated personal (which are seen to become market) fail-
ures through nudges, such as small financial incentives or 
information provision. Social theory is a simplification of 
reality: virtualism is an abstraction from reality, which 
accounts for its failures.
“Global markets are regarded as pre- given natural facts in 
this discourse. At a time when ‘markets – like the weather - 
are just there (Ferrand et al., 2004: 3) it is the people who 
have to change” (Berndt, 2015: 580). The types of develop-
ment interventions often promoted represent a form of “roll 
out neoliberalism” (Peck and Tickell, 2002) to “correct” 
market failures, which are purportedly the result of wide-
spread irrational behaviors by people in the Global South, 
through education for example—a theme also taken up in a 
recent World Development Report (World Bank, 2015; for a 
critique, see Berndt and Boeckler, 2016).
In a field “sadly bereft of miracle cures”…[Duflo argues]… 
the analogy with medicine only goes so far. “With a clinical 
trial, the idea is to go into production… In economics, RCTs 
play a different role, usually [sic] they are much more about 
trying to understand something totally fundamental about 
behavior.” (Duflo quoted in Strauss, 2019)
However, this neglects the role of social structures, cul-
ture, and context, revealing the methodological individual-
ism of the approach, even if Banerjee and Duflo (2012) 
acknowledge a wider range of human motivations than just 
pecuniary ones—substituting “economic man” with “behav-
ioral man,” where it is assumed that (poor) people behave in 
the same way the world over when faced with ostensibly 
similar conditions and constraints. For example “by positing 
‘risk aversion’ as a universal character trait of smallholders, 
heterogeneous economic practices are reduced to a single 
explanatory variable” (Watts, 2013 quoted in Berndt, 2015: 
584).
The former chief economist at the World Bank, Laurence 
Summers, once said that the laws of economics were like the 
laws of engineering—they apply the same everywhere 
(Wade, 2014). Neoclassical economics and RCTs share a 
similar, if differentiated, a- contextualism. Unlike in neoclas-
sical economics, in behavioralist approaches, preferences are 
assumed to vary based on context, and consequently so too 
are beliefs (Fox and Klein, 2020). However, behavioral man 
is assumed to make the same choices the world over if faced 
with the same circumstances and (lack of) education.
Theoretical and methodological issues in 
the design and practice of RCTs
The attempt to downplay or remove contextual factors comes 
at a cost, however. As the motto of the “home” of RCTs in 
development, the Abdul Lateef Jameel Poverty Action Lab 
(J- PAL) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology affirms, 
the goal of RCTs is to determine “what works.” It is thought 
that a properly designed and implemented experiment will 
remove all potential confounding variables, leaving little 
uncertainty as to the effectiveness of aid or policy programs. 
However as Cartwright (2007) has argued, this pursuit of 
“internal validity” comes at the cost of knowing little about 
the applicability of any RCT in another context. “With het-
erogeneous treatment effects, the ATE [average treatment 
effect] is only as good as the study sample from which it was 
obtained” (Deaton and Cartwright, 2018: 5). And yet, for 
many proponents, this is simply not the case: RCTs are prof-
fered as the means to know about generalizable results of 
interventions that can be used elsewhere. For example Duflo 
and Kremer (2008: 93) state that “credible impact evalua-
tions are global public goods in the sense that they can offer 
reliable guidance to international organizations, govern-
ments, donors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
beyond national borders” (quoted in Deaton and Cartwright, 
2018: 11). There is a tendency to make “sweeping macro- 
level generalizations on the basis of small- scale, micro- level 
evidence” (Kabeer, 2020: 12). This is based on the implicit 
assumption of the existence of behavioral man.
In other cases, the claims for extrapolation are more mod-
est—for example, being based on what the former chief econo-
mist at the World Bank called “reasoned intuition” (Basu, 2014). 
This may be a reasonable position, but it then makes RCTs more 
akin to qualitative methods, rather than observing strict sci-
entism, as is supposed to be the case. As Donovan (2018: 20) 
notes, “RCTs are a form of historical documentation, telling you 
what resulted in one case. They do not offer sturdy grounds for 
projection into the future,” even in the places where they are 
conducted, as they only capture a snapshot in time and effects 
may be non- linear and have knock- ons (Bédécarrats et al., 
2019). Furthermore, even in cases where academic economists 
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are careful to note the limited “external validity” of a given RCT 
for other contexts, the incorporation of results into policy means 
such caution rarely follows individual studies that have been 
used to justify aid interventions elsewhere.
In the modelling of economics after medicine, behavioral 
man (homo disordines morum) stands in for the presumed 
mechanistic relationship between aid interventions and results. 
The assumed response of behavioral man stems from the rela-
tively homogenous response of biological systems, in which 
treatment impacts follow the laws of nature and act on involun-
tary processes in the human body. In contrast, in the social and 
economic settings of RCTs, humans are certainly less controlla-
ble than body functions, consciously choose their responses, and 
exhibit heterogeneous perceptions of, and responses to, random-
ized interventions based on social context, that is, societal, insti-
tutional and community culture, and economic structures and 
individual personalities. Thus, the fallacy of scientism in neo-
classical economics finds its analogue in the design and applica-
tion of RCTs.
By way of illustration, Barrett and Carter (2010) argue that 
payment incentives—where money is given to participate in the 
experiment (a tool commonly utilized in RCTs)—can create a 
treatment sample that differs from that in the general population 
that would eventually take up an intervention in a nonrandom 
program without personal subsidies. RCTs in the social sciences 
also differ from those in medical experiments because, in the 
latter, participants will usually not know how the treatment will 
affect them, whereas, in the former, interventions often require 
individuals to understand effects well enough to evaluate bene-
fits. Double- blinding (common in medical studies)—where nei-
ther the participants nor the researchers know who is in treatment 
and control groups—is nearly impossible in economic RCTs. 
Because in orthodox economics, humans are understood to be 
universally utilitarian, proponents of RCTs are able to envision 
the generalization of individual findings. The utility of many 
economists’ medical envy is, therefore, less an epistemological 
one—the presumed increase in intellectual rigor—than perhaps 
one of legitimation.
Indeed, the design of RCTs strips out the means through 
which social change occurs, leaving only results, which propo-
nents often implicitly treat as universal. Consequently, RCTs 
offer little by way of explanation, but many researchers specu-
late about the replicability of their findings with little under-
standing of local context. This issue is meant to be overcome by 
“multiple treatment experiment, so as to identify the key compo-
nents of a broader development program that are working rather 
than assessing entirely the broader policy intervention (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2008)” (Webber, 2015: 42). Thus, the incomplete and 
inappropriate adoption of scientism ignores heterogeneity and 
compromises internal validity of RCTs. Internal validity can 
also be weakened by imperfect randomization and spillover 
effects.
Imperfect randomization can arise as participants may 
refuse to participate (Deaton and Cartwright, 2018) or try to 
switch their identification from control to treatment, or 
implementers target those in need. In reality, RCTs almost 
always depart from an ideal design as differentiation between 
treatment and control by a factor, such as location, can have 
unexpected results (Scriven, 2008; via Shaffer, 2011). This is 
problematic, given that the core purpose of RCTs—to identify 
an average treatment effect—relies completely on random 
assignment.
Similarly, spillover effects are usually present in experiments, 
disrupting external and internal validity. Yet, RCT practitioners 
typically assume their nonexistence. For example, if villagers 
are provided with a conditional cash transfer if their children 
attend school, the parents in the control group might also feel 
pressure to send their children to school, spilling the effects of 
the experiment into the control group. Spillover effects also 
become a problem for external validity because if unaccounted 
for, they render experiments nonreplicable, which they are any-
way because conditions change, even in the same places, 
through time.
External validity is widely acknowledged to be a fundamental 
weakness of RCTs in their current state (Deaton and Cartwright, 
2018). However, advocates typically ignore external validity or 
baselessly assume it. Rodrik (2008) notes that many economists 
often spend a great deal of their papers defending the internal 
validity of their studies, dedicating whole sections to robustness 
checks and regression diagnostics, yet external validity (replicabil-
ity across geographies) usually only gets a passing mention, if any. 
However, external validity is vitally important particularly to agen-
cies like the World Bank, which are interested in scaling up to 
broader policy positions. To “solve” the issue of external validity, 
some proponents argue for widespread RCT implementation to 
anywhere previous impact evaluations are not generalizable, a pro-
posal infeasible in terms of time and money, and unrealistic given 
that researchers have no professional incentives to do so. 
Replication of an RCT with only a couple of key characteristics 
changed (e.g. location, sample size) is unlikely to be published in a 
top journal or earn the author professional success (Rodrik, 2008).
Heterogeneity in participant responses, implementer charac-
teristics, and structural or contextual factors also affect external 
validity, meaning that scaling up in the same setting or replicating 
in a different one could produce markedly different results and 
consequently is a poor guide to policy. Even in the same location, 
an increase in scale or a change in the implementing institution 
could produce radically different estimates in an analysis. For 
example, if an RCT measures an NGO- run program, the results 
do not necessarily inform the effects of a scaled- up, government- 
run version. More importantly, an RCT randomizes across a 
sample, ensuring a relatively even mix of people for whom the 
evaluation has a low to high impact. If scaled up to national level 
as a nonrandom intervention, it will naturally tend to have higher 
representation from high- impact types, such as people living in 
poverty (Ravallion, 2009). A program that increases small farm-
ers cocoa yields, for example, may increase their incomes if 
rolled- out at a small scale, but depress them through price effects 
if scaled up, given low income elasticities of demand (Deaton 
and Cartwright, 2018).
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Shaffer (2011) discusses a different issue—the limitations 
of RCTs regarding the conception of causation inherent in their 
methodology. RCTs use the idea of comparison to a counter-
factual to establish causation (i.e. program P must cause out-
come O, and outcome O cannot exist without program P), a 
method that seems reasonable but can require odd conclusions. 
For example, say two micro- credit programs, A and B, both 
lend to the same population and do not overlap their client base 
(i.e. if one program is lending to an individual, then the other 
one will not), and succeed in increasing income I for the popu-
lation they serve. Intuitively, one would argue that A had a 
causal impact on income I. However, following the RCT 
framework, A in fact did not have a causal impact on I, because, 
although A caused I, if A did not exist, I would still exist (via 
program B). Indeed, Shaffer (2011) quotes the following 
exchange between Thomas Cook and James Heckman to illus-
trate the real- world applications of the RCT framework in the 
context of a job training program. Cook argues that RCTs 
should measure whether “a treatment is better than some alter-
native”—in this case, whether there were other options for job 
training outside of the program (Cook, 2000: 79). Heckman 
(2000: 83) replied:
… the job training experiment Cook mentioned actual-
ly killed the large- scale Job Training and Partnership Act 
(JTPA) program because of what we call substitution bias. 
Subjects who were randomized out of the study had excel-
lent substitutes for the program, resulting in a gross under-
estimation of the program’s effectiveness. (emphasis added)
The issues arising from substitution bias had nothing to do 
with internal validity; rather, the issue is whether the control 
group provides a relevant comparison. Schaffer (2008) argues 
that there are multiple models of causal inference, including 
some that do not rely on a counterfactual. He categorizes these 
models into two broad categories. First, “the nomological, sta-
tistical, counterfactual, and agential accounts…understand 
connection in terms of probability: causing is making more 
likely.” RCTs are probabilistic because they assess whether the 
difference between the treatment and control group is statisti-
cally significant. The second approach sees causation as a pro-
cess that is “mechanism based” and where “causing is 
physically producing.”
Mechanism- based approaches are quantifiable insofar as 
identifying an impact versus no impact is possible (an outcome 
that is clearly quantifiable), are typically more externally valid 
than RCTs, and interpret causation by identifying the mecha-
nism through which a program operates (a strategy that would 
not fall prey to the failure of RCTs in Heckman’s job training 
story).
Although RCTs in principle provide unbiased estimators of 
the average effect, they do not guarantee the minimal vari-
ance of these estimators any more than they can calculate 
the median effect or effect by quantile. This is particularly 
problematic when treatment effects are heterogeneous, 
which is commonplace in both medicine and development. 
(Bédécarrats et al., 2019: 742)
Ethics
Arguably more important than methodological limitations are 
the ethical concerns surrounding RCTs, often deployed in the 
Global South—particularly the violation of one of the most 
basic principles of conducting research “do no harm.” Since 
RCTs operate in nonmedical environments with uncontrollable 
variables and studies are often implemented in partnership with 
real economic institutions or through markets, the complexity 
of the study often results in unintended and sometimes adverse 
consequences. Barrett and Carter (2010) cite Bertrand et al. 
(2007), in which the authors randomized incentives for partici-
pants in India to bribe officials in order to give them a driver’s 
license. This is a clear violation of “do no harm,” given the 
danger to innocent non- subjects of enabling unsafe drivers to 
get licenses. Shockingly, this study was published in the high- 
impact Quarterly Journal of Economics.
A second ethical issue often at play in RCTs is the suspen-
sion of informed consent. Researchers argue that obtaining 
informed consent would bias experiments, and indeed the 
purity of many economic interventions would be spoiled if par-
ticipants were aware that they were part of an experiment, 
although as noted earlier, in practice, participants often are 
aware of this. As stated by Barrett and Carter (2010: 52), “This 
raises the subtle but important distinction between treating 
human beings as willful agents who have a right to participate 
or not as they so choose, versus treating them as subjects to be 
manipulated for research purposes.” Such an approach repli-
cates colonial approaches to conducting research, which have a 
long and ignoble history (Tilley, 2011). This is a type of episte-
micide (Santos, 2014), as “these technologies not only homog-
enizes and problematizes non- Western knowledge systems, 
subjectivities and agency – it also justifies the economization 
of social life through development” (Klein, 2017: 482).
Third, in medical clinical trials, participants are typically 
blind to their assignment to treatment or control, but as noted 
this is often infeasible in development RCTs. This inability to 
blind participants could and often does result in stress for the 
control group, particularly since, by design, this will include 
individuals who need the intervention. It is ethically concerning 
to enact development programs with full knowledge that some 
who will be included in the treatment group do not need the 
intervention whereas others in the control group do. 
Consequently, participants often attempt to undo their group 
assignment or, if possible, repeatedly drop from studies until 
they obtain treatment status. Researchers who privilege com-
passion over statistical purity may also change participant 
assignment from control to treatment. Both of these actions vio-
late the experiment’s internal validity and bias results.
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Fourth, there is the ongoing issue of predominantly Western 
researchers experimenting on primarily poor African subjects in 
a manner that exploits extreme poverty and is arguably coer-
cive. The use of Africa as a focal point for experimentation has 
a long history both in medical and policy terms. Well- publicized 
cases like the 1996 Pfizer meningitis drug trials that led to the 
death of 11 children is only one of many unethical trials under-
taken in Africa in recent decades (SOMO, 2008). There is little 
doubt that the frequent absence of regulatory structures or lax 
enforcement, low compensation to experimental subjects, a 
lack of legal recourse for participants, and governments long 
subservient to the latest fashions and fads from the donor com-
munity have again driven the arrival of Bank- sponsored RCTs 
on the continent. As discussed in a note above, the Development 
Impact Evaluation (DIME) group under the World Bank’s DEC 
(Development Economics Vice Presidency) is the main unit in 
the Bank undertaking RCTs. Roughly 60% of the listed impact 
evaluations sponsored by DIME were undertaken in Africa 
between 2006 and 2019 (World Bank, 2019).
Lawrence Summers famously wrote in a memo when he was 
at the World Bank that it made economic sense to dump toxic 
waste in Africa given people’s low life expectancies (Harvard 
Magazine, 2001). Such thinking continues in relation to the cur-
rent COVID-19 pandemic. A French scientist recently argued 
that trials of previous vaccines for effectiveness should take place 
in Africa: “If I can be provocative, shouldn’t this study be done in 
Africa, where there are no masks, no treatment, no intensive care, 
a bit like it is done in some studies on AIDS or among prosti-
tutes” (Mira quoted in Euronews, 2020). In this imaginary, Africa 
is conceptualized as a tabula rasa for scientific experimentation: 
huge socio- spatial differences on the continent are erased in favor 
of methodological continentalism.
The last area of ethical concern is in relation to how develop-
ment money should be spent. Arguably scarce resources should 
be guided by local information about those in need of treatment 
or to where knowledge for policy is most needed. Evaluation 
methods should be selected to fit the policy. The proliferation of 
RCTs often reverses the process, fitting development assistance 
to what can be randomly evaluated. This is often antithetical to 
national development, as it is rarely feasible to randomize the 
location of infrastructure projects and other programs essential 
to a country’s development. Ravallion (2009: 2) argues that “the 
very idea of randomized assignment is antithetical to most 
development programs, which typically aim to reach certain 
types of people or places.” Thus, we see RCTs hindering pro-
ductive investment and research, as governments, NGOs, aca-
demics, and the World Bank are often unwilling to undertake 
projects that cannot be evaluated via randomization.
Answering the wrong questions
In addition to distorting the direction of the development research 
agenda, RCTs often provide information of little use to policy-
makers as they usually provide no discussion of why develop-
ment interventions vary in their effectiveness temporally and 
spatially, which is more relevant to a policymaker than the aver-
age treatment effect of a certain intervention. RCTs attempt to 
remove heterogeneity, yet it should be the object of discussion. 
The variation that results from structural and contextual factors, 
between participants, and from the different approaches to each 
trial while compromising RCTs in terms of external validity, also 
holds the potential to answer important development questions, 
if adequately investigated. However, Shaffer (2011) argues that 
RCTs do not provide sufficient information to address relevant 
policy questions, namely, the mechanisms through which impacts 
occur and how they are affected by context. Or as Barrett and 
Carter (2010: 525) put it, “Precise answers to the wrong question 
are not always helpful.” In addition, RCTs cannot measure the 
opportunity costs of different policy options.
RCTs are able to measure two parameters: the “intent- to- 
treat” (ITT) parameter, which measures the average treatment 
effect among those given the opportunity to get treatment, and 
the “average treatment effect on the treated” (ATET), which is 
the average impact on participants who actually received treat-
ment. As Ravallion (2009: 2) comments:
I have rarely found that policy makers care only about these 
two parameters. They also want to answer questions like: 
Does the intervention work the way it was intended? What 
types of people gain, and what types lose? What proportion 
of the participants benefit? What happens when the program 
is scaled up? How might it be designed differently to en-
hance impact? These questions are unanswerable by pure 
RCT experimental design.
The fact that the World Bank, one of the world’s most 
prominent multilateral institutions, is conducting, funding, 
or publishing research using an approach with often dubious 
ethical standards does not bode well for development, espe-
cially when used to legitimize its ongoing neoliberal agenda.
World Bank RCTs: examples from the 
experimental terrain
To investigate this, we created a database of 292 Impact 
Evaluation studies from DIME of the World Bank, done 
between 1996 and 2019. DIME’s mandate was to stress two 
goals: institutionalizing evidence- based policy and “improve-
ment in the quality of Bank operations.” It was created in 2005 
by the Chief Economist of the World Bank to further these 
goals. This was initially possible due to the creation of a trust 
fund on impact evaluations funded by the Spanish and United 
Kingdom (UK) governments (Legovini, 2010). Over time, 
DIME has become a central focal point of donor- financed 
efforts to promote RCTs. In 2013, the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) created a multi- partner 
trust fund to support impact evaluation studies by DIME, 
which by 2018 had raised $180 million in funding from 30 
donors in 18 countries (World Bank, 2018).
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We focused on 100 of the most recently produced RCTs 
after 2015. Roughly two- thirds of the experiments used partial 
or full randomization. Experiments were designed around the 
same concepts long embedded in the World Bank’s commit-
ment to neoliberalism and lead to little alteration in broad pol-
icy strategies. They evaluate payment for performance in 
health care, the impact of vouchers that can be used for private 
or public clinics, the impact of different prices on the willing-
ness of the poor to pay for electricity, the impact of business 
registration reform to increase informal business registration, 
the role of private–public partnerships in distributing ARTs 
(anti- retroviral therapies), the impact of contracts on teacher 
performance, the impact of decentralization and information 
access reform on government outcomes, and so forth. They 
might change the financing model of private sector involve-
ment in healthcare (e.g. subsidizing the cost to poor patients), 
but not the commitment to growing private health care sys-
tems; abandon public support of education in favor of private–
public partnerships, and so on. Studies use the same orthodox 
economic style focusing on methodological individualism dis-
cussed above, where “improvements” in social behavior will 
arise from a slight nudge with things like subsidies or cash pay-
ments. The World Bank has also heavily promoted RCTs 
through its flagship publications, like the World Bank Economic 
Review, which has published dozens of papers in recent years 
on development experiments. For purposes of illustration of 
methodological flaws, we have selected two papers—one from 
its journals and one from its working paper series arising from 
World Bank financed RCTs. They cover different subjects, but 
both illustrate the nature of the “behavioral man” approach as 
well as other methodological pitfalls raised in this paper.10
The first is in line with the neoliberal objective of expanding 
the privatization of property rights, which often elides the com-
plex terrain around these, including gender (Askew and 
Odgaard, 2019). In the context of the coloniality of power, the 
push to expand private property rights on land in Africa has 
been a high priority of the World Economic Forum and G7 
(Group of 7)11 (Maganga et al., 2016). The second is also 
decontextualized from social complexities, and the gendered 
dynamics of HIV in Africa, revealing the fallacy of “behavioral 
man” (Kalipeni and Ghosh, 2012). Sexuality is seen as a prod-
uct of individual behavior, where financial incentives can shift 
the locus of costs and benefits so individuals will make choices 
that reduce individual and community health risk, rather than 
placing these “choices” in a structural context where “freedom 
to choose” may not exist, for sex workers, for example.
The first study was conducted by Ali et al. (2014) to investi-
gate whether or not price instruments alone could increase par-
ticipation and gender equality of formal land registration in an 
informal settlement in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The focus of 
the study was to pinpoint the barriers to the expansion of titling 
in Tanzania, which despite committing to a titling agenda in 
1999 expanded rather slowly. Beginning in 2005, when it 
launched a pilot program for rural titling, the World Bank put a 
high priority on this as evidenced through a series of loans for 
hundreds of millions of dollars (Owens et al., 2018; Stein, 
2020). The study also investigated why women were discrimi-
nated against in land holdings (despite the explicit language in 
the Land Act of 1999 assuring gender equity in land). The 
World Bank authors are effusive in reporting the overwhelming 
evidence of the “positive effects” of titling. Hence, for them, 
the key is to understand the divergence between rational eco-
nomic and “behavioral man” to try to explain the slow pace of 
adjudication of land ownership in Tanzania. In their neoclassi-
cal world, the focus is on individual decision- making and pric-
ing and “whether demand for titles is simply too low to justify 
the high fixed costs of systematic demarcation” (Ali et al., 
2014: 2). Similarly, they ask “also on the demand side, why do 
households fail to record women’s ownership claims on house-
hold land, and how can they be incentivized to do so?” (Ali 
et al., 2014: 2). Their focus is on generating advice to the 
Tanzania government on “how should it price titles going for-
ward” (Ali et al., 2014: 2). Hence, the key is to discover ways 
to nudge “behavioral man” with sufficient subsidies so they 
will make “more rational” choices and seek private titles that 
include women on the deeds.12 For this purpose, they institute 
vouchers that discount the normal price of titling.
Vouchers were either “unconditional” (a randomized dis-
count) or “conditional” vouchers, where discounts were con-
tingent on including the spouse’s name on the land title. The 
terms of the conditional vouchers, as well as the larger proce-
dure of the experiment, were explained to participants at a 
ward- level meeting, which was held by Women’s Advancement 
Trust (WAT), an NGO founded by a prominent female 
Tanzanian politician. The authors found that while participants 
were more likely to purchase land titles from both the uncondi-
tional and conditional vouchers, thus confirming that price was 
the main determinant in title uptake, the rate of uptake was not 
high enough for the program to be financially self- sustaining 
by generating sufficient revenue through participation.
The ready uptake of the conditional vouchers was surpris-
ing to the authors, especially since only 13% of women were 
listed on land titles before the intervention. They were unsure 
how to interpret this result: either husbands were willing to 
forgo some bargaining power in exchange for a cheaper land 
title, or the authors had been incorrect to assume co- titling 
would increase gender equality and in reality co- titling did not 
affect the household’s gendered power inequalities.
This study utilized an RCT approach that suffered from 
multiple issues discussed above, including imperfect random-
ization. On page 11, Ali et al. (2014) acknowledge that they 
were concerned with the perceived unfairness of the random 
allocation process. They therefore decided to draw the voucher 
distribution 100 different times and keep the most balanced 
three draws that were most representative of the different types 
of land parcels and ownership. To test whether or not this pro-
cess resulted in imperfect randomization, they ran a regression 
of each baseline characteristic on voucher values to test for bal-
ance between treatment and control and found point estimates 
on some coefficients to be statistically significant, which means 
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that randomization was imperfect. To account for this, they 
controlled for the imperfectly balanced variables in their anal-
ysis, which, although common practice in RCT analysis, is ill- 
advised given its potential for data mining to produce the 
correct results and the fact that no clear protocols govern this 
practice (Shaffer, 2011). There was also no discussion in the 
results section of the fact that almost half of their randomized 
sample was unavailable for the experiment due to flooding in 
one of the two communities in which they worked.
This study also illustrates the tendency of RCTs to answer 
the wrong questions. Policy makers might be interested in how 
to improve gender equality in land holdings and empower 
women in household dynamics; yet this study merely demon-
strated a willingness to add wives to land titles in exchange for 
titling discounts. The authors themselves acknowledge that 
their assumption that co- titling would improve gender equality 
could have been completely incorrect, especially in light of the 
high uptake of conditional vouchers. Structured interviews 
would have provided insight into the perceptions of co- titling 
among participants, giving more meaning to the study’s results 
(Prowse, 2013). They would also have allowed for a fuller 
explanation of the high rate of voucher uptake, which might 
have been partly driven by increased confidence in the titling 
process because of perceived reduction of bureaucratic obsta-
cles, as it was managed by an NGO rather than the 
government.
In addition, at the end of their results section, the reader is 
suddenly informed that female co- titling increased from 13% 
to 75% in the control group due to the activities of WAT, noted 
above, an NGO “strongly committed to promoting female 
empowerment” (Ali et al., 2014). An increase of this magni-
tude begs the question of what the NGO was doing in the back-
ground and how it affected the treatment group, yet little 
information is given. Without knowing more, the authors’ 
claim of the effectiveness of their co- titling intervention 
becomes questionable. Any claim to a generalizable effect sim-
ilarly becomes dubious, as it is difficult to imagine replicating 
these results elsewhere without a comparable NGO present.
Given the likely large sum of money required for this inter-
vention, one might wonder if the World Bank has an obligation 
to spend more wisely. The authors concluded that the Tanzanian 
government could not afford to title at their given costs without 
losing money (so the program could not be self- sustaining) but 
was unable to offer any cost–benefit analysis of alternative pro- 
poor policies.
The second study was conducted by Kohler and Thornton 
(2012) and investigated the effect of a conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) program in rural Malawi which incentivized people to 
maintain their HIV status for a year. Here, it is presumed that a 
rational human being would choose to remain HIV- negative if 
all information and risk were known. However, the world of 
behavioral man is one where imperfect information reigns and 
where the pleasure of unprotected sex and the cost of contra-
ception is weighed against the risk of getting HIV from inter-
course. Providing financial incentives will add an additional 
opportunity cost to unprotected sex by considering the possi-
bility of foregoing income if an individual becomes HIV- 
positive, hence nudging behavioral man toward the 
decision- making of homo economicus. Participants were ran-
domly selected from an earlier survey conducted in the same 
area and were offered an HIV test. Each person was told that if 
they maintained their HIV status, they would receive money in 
a year. After a year of regular check- ins, participants were 
again tested and were paid if they had maintained their HIV 
status.
Out of the 1,307 participants who had enrolled in the 
project, 1,076 continued their involvement throughout the 
entire experiment. However, people who had tested HIV- 
positive during the first test were statistically likely to 
drop out before the concluding test. Indeed, the preva-
lence rate of HIV was 9.2% in the sample during the time 
of the initial test, while after the final test the rate was less 
than 1%. The authors found no impact of the conditional 
cash transfer on reported sexual behavior, but did find 
large effects on sexual activity after receiving the money. 
The authors (Kohler and Thornton, 2012: 169) share these 
results:
Men who received the money were 12.3 percentage points 
more likely to have vaginal sex and had approximately 0.5 
days more of  sex... on the other hand, women were 6.7 per-
centage points less likely to have engaged in risky sex, a 
result that is driven by abstinence rather than increased con-
dom use.
The authors conclude that the effectiveness of CCT 
programs to incentivize safe sexual behavior should be 
questioned not for the wholly unethical nature of the 
experiment, but because of the universal neoclassical 
economic dictum that “money given in the present may 
have stronger effects than rewards offered in the future” 
(Kohler and Thornton, 2012: 165), as a result of economic 
discounting, which reduced the present value of the future 
award offered in the experiment.
The study illustrates a number of the issues raised 
above including asking the wrong question and external 
validity. Instead of generating testable hypothesis from a 
deep understanding of the socioeconomic factors that 
lead to greater vulnerability to the virus, the study assumes 
behavior is an atomistic decision where individuals only 
need to be sufficiently compensated for the disutility of 
giving up unprotected sex. Here, we have the behavioral 
man construct at work. Risky behavior is not ideal and in 
conflict with rational behavior. The key is to provide the 
incentive to move individuals toward fully rational behav-
ior. Hence, ex ante behavior might fall short, but ex post 
behavior will be consistent with neoclassical economic 
man. Homo economicus can be resurrected by altering the 
incentives within choice architectural constructs that 
have generated “imperfect people.” Even if somehow 
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financial incentives led to the desired results, how would 
the authors have confirmed its external validity? There 
would not only be the issue of determining the correct 
monetary compensation, but it would also mean a com-
plete dismissal of the complex socioeconomic conditions 
that made the experiment work at that moment in time 
with that set of individuals.
The ethical issue discussed above also looms large—
the violation of the “do no harm” principle. The research-
ers actually created a situation where men engaged in 
more risky sex in an area where a randomized sample pro-
duced a 9.2% prevalence rate of HIV. Researchers also 
provided no treatment or support to participants after 
their first HIV test, in which some people learned that 
they were infected, resulting in likely significant emo-
tional trauma. Thus, the large attrition rate of HIV- positive 
participants is potentially explained by health complica-
tions, emotional trauma, and potential public shame. It 
has been widely documented in Malawi and other East 
African countries that there are negative social stigmas 
attached to HIV/AIDS (Pindani et al., 2014). In addition, 
at the time of the study (2006), Malawi was in the early 
stages of the rollout of ARTs which had only started in 
2004, so it is entirely possible that no treatment options 
were available.
Creating such a situation without offering HIV treatment 
risks fatally harming subjects, an unacceptable consequence of 
research. Moreover, these risks were pursued to gain knowl-
edge that was arguably not important, as the authors them-
selves admit that “any effect of [cash transfer] programs may 
be fairly sensitive to the specific design of the program, the 
local and/or cultural context, and the degree of agency individ-
uals have with respect to sexual behaviors” (Kohler and 
Thornton, 2012: 167)—that is, geography. Thus, it was known 
that results would not be generalizable.
Conclusions: New paint, same economics
Neoliberalism can no longer be treated as a particular (right- 
wing) ideological position within a broader political horizon; 
today neoliberalism posits itself as a political horizon that can 
host within it a spectrum of ideological positions, a govern-
mental reason that can accommodate a certain degree of polit-
ical variation and an economic mainstream that can cultivate a 
range of epistemological and methodological diversity (Madra 
and Adaman, 2014: 711).13
There is little evidence that RCTs have altered the over-
all international development policy agenda in any signif-
icant way. At the same time, RCT studies undertaken at 
great expense raise a plethora of methodological and ethi-
cal questions, including the continuation of the usage of 
sub- Saharan Africa as a zone for experimentation. “It is 
the very methodological weaknesses of RCTs that imbues 
them with the authority they hold: for to deny the reliabil-
ity of a particular study, one must reach for more data, 
more studies, larger RCTs, in order to justify the validity 
of one’s objections” (McGoey, 2010 quoted in Donovan, 
2018: 23). The result is “disqualification and crowding out 
of alternative methods, ever- growing use of allocated 
resources, and rent positions” (Bédécarrats et al., 2019: 
736).
Despite their ostensible differences, both RCTs and 
neoclassical economics/neoliberalism are characterized 
by unrealistic assumptions, including methodological 
individualism. As Donovan (2018: 34) notes “the rand-
omistas and these critics with whom they engage operate 
within the bounds of mainstream, neoclassical econom-
ics.” This is not accidental but stems from a common 
desire for scientism. Despite their real ideological differ-
ences and the fact that RCTs may be useful if supported 
by other evidence (Deaton and Cartwright, 2018: Kabeer, 
2020), they therefore share a common lineage epistemo-
logically. What this means is that RCTs do not challenge 
neoliberalism but rather can be inserted into and help 
legitimize it. With neoclassical economics in question in 
the wake of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis, with even 
the English Queen asking why economists had not fore-
seen it, behavioralism filled the void (Berndt, 2015: 
583)—perhaps partly accounting for Ester Duflo’s desire 
to extend the use of these governance technologies in the 
Global North.14 As Berndt (2015: 583) notes, behavioral 
economics “provides a means to stabilize the neoclassical 
project during turbulent times, translating it into a uto-
pian yardstick to measure concrete economic behaviors 
and as a behavioral norm performing economic 
realities.”
RCTs do not challenge or alter the structural conditions 
producing poverty but fit into the ameliorative or residual 
model of poverty reduction, which is compatible with the 
maintenance of neoliberal macro- economic, trade, and 
capital regimes, associated with fallacies of composi-
tion.15 Hence, they buttress the neoclassical development 
economics project to shift the light away from the inequi-
ties embedded in the global order toward a perception of 
poverty as a microeconomic phenomenon that arises from 
individual utility maximizing behavior.
None of the most successful developing countries in 
the world, such as Vietnam or China, have grounded their 
development strategies in RCTs (Bédécarrats et al., 2019), 
but rather heterodox economic policies. Behavioral eco-
nomics and RCTs responsibilize the poor, making them 
culpable for “bad decisions” that lead to their poverty 
(Berndt and Boeckler, 2016). However, it is affects rather 
than “choices” or “agency” that produce outcomes (Fox 
and Klein, 2020). Thus, the rise of behavioral man fits 
neatly with the continuance of neoliberal models of gover-
nance and developmentality (Lie, 2015), rather than 
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fundamentally altering the behavior of those who should 
change.
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Notes
1. These are conceptualized in this schema as domestic liberal 
reformers, rather than those seeking reform of the international 
system.
2. Among other things, the report criticized the Bank’s “mis-
placed reliance” on cross-country regressions on growth, aid, 
and poverty. While Deaton is more critical of RCTs, the team 
of authors included strong proponents of the methodology 
including Duflo, Banerjee, and Kremer. At the Bank, RCTs 
were housed or run out of the Development Impact Evaluation 
(DIME) group. As noted below, DIME was created by the 
World Bank Chief Economist in 2005 to further the use of “ev-
idence-based policy.” In 2004, prior to its creation, the Bank 
had only 28 active impact evaluations (IEs). However follow-
ing the Banerjee et al. (2006) review of research, the number of 
impact evaluations increased to more than 150 active studies 
by 2007. After the Bank set impact evaluation as a corporate 
priority in 2008, the number of studies grew rapidly along with 
efforts to build and train networks of economists to undertake 
RCTs in Africa and elsewhere (nearly 300 active studies by 
2010). Spending on impact evaluation went from an average 
of $160,000 2000–2004 to $13–14 million in 2010. In 2010, 
the largest percentage of active IEs undertaken by DIME were 
in sub-Saharan Africa (43%) (Legovini, 2010). As discussed 
below, this is a trend that has continued to the present.
3. In some cases, there is more than one target group, which re-
ceives different types of interventions.
4. One reviewer inquired why we used the term “ behavioral 
man” with its gendered implications. We are following the 
tradition of neoclassical economics, which tends to reduce 
all humanity into the singular unifying category of homo eco-
nomicus. Irrespective of gender, race or ethnicity, everyone is 
assumed to behave in the same manner. RCTs utilizes the same 
construct of the universal individual with the variations out-
lined in the paper.
5. In another example, Duflo (2012: 1076 quoted in Kabeer, 
2020: 17) argues that while gender-affirmative policies may 
have “some collateral benefits” for women, these may not suf-
ficiently compensate for the “costs of the distortion associated 
with such redistribution.”
6. Michael Kremer also won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 
2019 with Banerjee and Duflo for his work on RCTs.
7. As Hirschman (1981: 4) notes, the development economics 
of the post-war period which was multi-paradigmatic and ex-
amined important structural and institutional dimensions was 
being replaced by a returned orthodoxy with “its powerful theo-
rems of universal validity” with benefits flowing to individuals 
from markets “from voluntary acts of economic intercourse.” 
Bardham and Udry (1999) provide one of the first mainstream 
Development Microeconomic textbooks. Behavioral develop-
ment economics is a continuation of this trend toward seeing 
development as microeconomic with a focus on individual de-
cision-making. See Kremer et al. (2019) for an exposition of 
behavioral development economics.
8. There is a fourth position ignored by most mainstream econ-
omists which is the rejection of neoclassical economics 
and its replacement by other paradigms like institutional or 
post-Keynesian approaches.
9. The implication being that if you choose poorly you will be 
punished by the market—a form of “market justice” associat-
ed with meritocracy based on cognitive ability. Consequently, 
the undeserving poor will remain so if they remain trapped in 
fast “system 1” intuitive thinking (Kahneman, 2012), whereas 
the market favours “survival of the fittest”/slowest (system 2) 
thinkers.
10. It should be noted that one of the authors has worked with 
an interdisciplinary team since 2008 on property right for-
malization in Tanzania. The team consists of anthropologists 
Kelly Askew and Rie Odgaard, geographer Faustin Maganga, 
and economist Howard Stein. The HIV study was written 
by Rebecca Thornton when she was at the University of 
Michigan and was presented to a graduate class of Howard 
Stein. This brings a more detailed understanding to these 
papers.
11. This was previously the G8 before Russia was disinvited from 
the group over its annexation of Crimea.
12. Our study of formalization in Tanzania presents a different pic-
ture. Many villagers did not collect their titles even when they 
were done without expense or at low cost. They saw few of the 
benefits promised by the proponents of titling, such as access 
to loans which were not forthcoming with titles and feared they 
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might be taxed once there was a record of ownership (Stein, 
2020; Stein et al., 2016).
13. Others, such as James Ferguson (2010), have also noted the 
political mutability of neoliberalism and the potential for de-
velopment of progressive social policies within its scope.
14. However, the stronger institutions of accountability in much of 
the Global North may account for their more limited use and 
relative lack of traction there. Equally, the fact that randomised 
evaluation may implicitly be a condition for aid disbursement 
implies added conditionality, where both Southern states and 
Southern populations are disciplined—increasing the extent of 
their roll-out in the Global South. Thus RCTs are not “theory 
free,” as they imply that certain Northern governors know bet-
ter than “beneficiaries” how to run their lives. As such there are 
parallels with the conditionalities attached to structural adjust-
ment loans from the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund.
15. A fallacy of composition is an “adding up” problem in eco-
nomics. For example, while increases in primary commodity 
exports might make sense for one country, if most or all de-
veloping countries are forced to do this by the World Bank/
International Monetary Fund. Given low income elasticities 
of demand for these products, prices will be driven into the 
cellar, making it collectively irrational. The same applies in 
behavioural programs to integrate small farmers into global 
value chains as “it is obvious that some person’s or group’s ar-
ticulation with global markets may be another’s disarticulation 
and marginalization” (Berndt, 2015: 585).
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